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A CORPUS-BASED STUDY OF ENGLISH DEMONSTRATIVES *THIS* AND *THAT*

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This study examines the use of the English demonstratives *this* and *that* by analyzing spoken corpus data. Despite the simple lexical meanings of the demonstratives, many second language (L2) learners of English have difficulty choosing appropriate forms due to different referential systems in English and their first language (L1). This paper first explains traditional proximal/distal distinctions of English demonstratives and then presents the Givenness Hierarchy (Gundel et al. 1993) and the gradient FOCUS model (Strauss 1993, 2002). Adopting a corpus-based analysis, this study suggests that practical, realistic examples help L2 learners to acquire the proper use of target language forms.

1. INTRODUCTION. When Koreans learn English, the usage of English demonstratives is taught at a very early stage, and Korean learners seem to understand the demonstratives without difficulties. In many textbooks for second language (L2) and foreign language learners of English, English demonstratives are usually explained in terms of physical proximity to the speaker (*this* refers to something/someone as being 'near' and *that* refers to something/someone as being 'not near' or 'near to addressee') and functions (either as a modifier or as a head). Here are typical example sentences:

(1) (a) Teacher: What is *this*? (The teacher indicates her or his hand.)
Student: *That* is your hand.

(b) Teacher: What is that? (The teacher indicates a student's hand.)
Student: *This* is my hand.

(Azar 1995:34)

It seems very easy for L2 learners of English to acquire demonstratives. Choosing an appropriate demonstrative form, however, is a subjective matter, and many Korean learners of English are confused when they use English demonstratives in conversations.

Despite the simple usage explained in many textbooks, then, why do Korean L2 learners use English demonstratives incorrectly? A possible problem that keeps Korean L2 learners of English from acquiring English demonstratives completely lies in the differences between the languages' demonstrative systems. For example, English has a set of two demonstratives (i.e., *this/these* and *that/those*), whereas Korean has three demonstratives (i.e., *i*, *ku*, and *ce*). According to Halliday and Hasan (1976), English *this/these* indicate proximity to the speaker, and *that/those* indicate distance from the speaker. Korean demonstratives, on the other hand, show a different set of distinctions. As Chang (1985) classified them, *i* refers to an entity "near the speaker," *ku* refers to an entity "not near the speaker or near the hearer," and *ce* refers to an entity "not near either the speaker or the hearer." Since English demonstratives do not correspond to Korean demonstratives, Korean L2 learners feel puzzled when trying to choose appropriate English demonstratives, taking subjective distance between the speaker and a referent into account in their word choice. Different demonstrative systems between two languages can influence L2 learners in acquiring the use of English demonstratives. Although some English dialects have three demonstrative systems, including *yon* and *yonder* to indicate something/someone that is not near either the speaker or the hearer (Halliday 1985), I will discuss only *this* and *that* in this paper, since *yon* and *yonder* are used only in some dialects, and are not standard English expressions.

In regard to L2 learners' acquisition of English demonstratives, Niimura and Hayashi (1996) examined the English and the Japanese demonstrative systems. Japanese, like Korean, uses a three-way system of demonstratives: *ko* is for a close referent, which is equivalent to *i* in Korean, *a* is for a distant referent, which is equivalent to Korean *ce*, and *so* is for a referent in between, which is equivalent to Korean *ku* (Chang 1985). In Niimura and Hayashi's study (1996), they first compared the different demonstrative systems of English and Japanese, and they administered a cloze test to native English speakers and Japanese learners of English in order to investigate differences in how the two groups used English demon-

stratives. Even advanced Japanese learners of English could not use English demonstratives as native English speakers did, which the researchers attributed to the different demonstrative systems of the two languages. That is, Japanese learners, like Korean learners, have problems in acquiring the usage of English demonstratives. In the following section, I will present some examples from Niimura and Hayashi's study (1996) in detail.

Niimura and Hayashi used a British comic strip "Beryl the Peril," from which they eliminated all demonstratives, and they asked native English speakers and Japanese learners of English to fill in the blanks.

FIGURE 1. Examples of the cloze test used in Niimura and Hayashi's study (1996:818).

FIGURE A



FIGURE B

In figure A, a male character notices a stain on the carpet. He looks at it, bending his knees and saying "Hmm! _____ a bad stain on the carpet!" In figure B, the same character looks at a piece of paper on the floor, standing upright and saying "Hello, what's _____?"

According to the results of the study, among the English speakers, 68% of them chose "*That is*" for figure A and 76% of them chose "*this*" for figure B, although the physical distance between the character and the object on the floor is closer in figure A than it is in figure B. It therefore does not seem that physical distance between the speaker and the referent is the primary factor for native English speakers in their choice of demonstratives. Niimura and Hayashi suggested that demonstrative *this* implies the speaker's strong curiosity toward the referent, whereas *that* implies less attention from the speaker to the referent. In other words, *this* and *that* are used to express the speaker's psychological closeness to or remoteness from the referent.

For advanced Japanese learners of English, on the other hand, 69% of them chose "*This is*" for figure A. In figure B, where the physical distance between the speaker and the referent is a little farther, 44% of advanced Japanese learners chose "*that.*" Apparently, Japanese learners of English tend to choose English demonstratives based mainly on the physical distance between the speaker and the referent.

Niimura and Hayashi claimed that native English speakers choose demonstratives based on psychological proximity and on the degree of attention to a referent, while Japanese learners of English choose English demonstratives based primarily on the physical distance between the speaker/hearer and the referent. Although psychological proximity can be a factor in choosing proper demonstrative forms in Japanese, Niimura and Hayashi argued that there are differences between the psychological factors influencing Japanese and English demonstratives. The psychological factors for Japanese demonstratives are related to the degree of mental closeness between a speaker and a referent, whereas those for English

demonstratives are related to "the degree of attention the hearer should pay to the referent" (Strauss 2002:135).

For the reasons discussed, it does not look simple for L2 learners of English to acquire the appropriate usage of English demonstratives *this* and *that*. How, then, can L2 learners of English learn to make use of *this* and *that* correctly? This study is motivated to examine how English demonstratives function and how native English speakers use them by considering the difficulties for L2 learners acquiring appropriate usage of *this* and *that*. In the next section, I will first review different approaches to English demonstratives to figure out the functions and usage of *this* and *that*. Then, I will investigate how native English speakers deal with English demonstratives in actual speech. For this study, I will adopt a corpus-based analysis, using a corpus concordance program, MonoConc Pro. Since many L2 teaching materials are based on non-empirical data, there can be significant differences between what the textbooks are presenting and how native speakers use languages in real contexts, which can lead L2 learners of English to be misinformed (McEnery and Wilson 2001). Hence empirical, realistic data analysis is necessary to assist both language teachers and learners providing them with more common examples that demonstrate the proper usage of English demonstratives.

In the last several decades, many linguists have been interested in using corpus data for linguistic analysis as well as for examining L2 pedagogical implications (Aston 1995, Biber 1988, Bley-Vroman and Ko 2005, Granger 2002, Hunston 2002, Kennedy 1998, McEnery and Wilson 1996). In addition, by virtue of recent technological developments, not only linguists but also language teachers and students can easily access various types of corpus data, including written or spoken, small or large, native or learner corpora, and so on. Corpus data make it possible to look at which expressions are used more frequently, and when and how the expressions are used. I will use spoken data collected from interviews and university student meetings, and drama scripts in this study, examining these sources in order to understand how English demonstratives are used in natural, interactional discourse contexts.

2. APPROACHES TO THE ENGLISH DEMONSTRATIVES *THIS* AND *THAT*. Speakers use different forms of expressions to refer to someone/something. They even change reference forms to mention the same things, depending on discourse situations. For example, to refer to an object 'book', an English speaker will choose one of the following forms: *a book, the book, this book, that book, this, that*, or *it*. So, how do speakers choose an appropriate form in every discourse situation, and how do interlocutors immediately understand what speakers are referring to? In order to help understand speakers' and interlocutors' processing of referring expressions, I will introduce several theoretical perspectives on English demonstratives in the following sections.

2.1 APPROACHES BASED ON DISTANCE. During the last several decades, many linguists have studied different forms and functions of reference (Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski 1993, Halliday 1985, Halliday and Hasan 1976, Lakoff 1974, Lyons 1979, Niimura and Hayashi 1996, Strauss 1993, 2002). English reference has traditionally been explained based on distance. Halliday and Hasan (1976) and Halliday (1985) suggested prominent contemporary examples. As presented in table 1, Halliday and Hasan (1976) classified the functions of *this* and *that* as "modifier" and as "head." Also, they distinguished them based on the proximity between a speaker/hearer and a referent. That is, *this* refers to something/someone near the speaker and *that* refers to something/someone far from the speaker.

TABLE 1. Halliday and Hasan's (1976) classification of English demonstrative reference.

		Function	
		Modifier	Head
Selective	Near	this/these + noun	this/these
	Far	that/those + noun	that/those

In a similar vein, Lakoff (1974) discussed the functions of *this* and *that* with respect to three major uses: spatio-temporal deixis, discourse deixis, and emotional deixis. Spatio-temporal *this* and *that* indicate proximity or distance between the speaker and the referent in space as well as in time. Discourse deictic *this* refers to discourse either before or after it, and refers to something specifically mentioned in the previous sentence. As shown in (2a), the discourse deictic *this* in the second sentence refers to the idea mentioned by the same speaker in the previous utterance. Discourse deictic *that*, on the other hand, is used by a speaker to comment immediately on what another speaker just mentioned. The deictic *that* in (2b) indicates the idea produced by the other speaker in the previous utterance.

(2) (a) Discourse deictic *this*
A: We should make a decision. *This* is what we have to do, now.

(b) Discourse deictic *that*
A: Let's have a break.
B: *That* is a good idea.

Lakoff proposed that emotional deictic *this* shows the speaker's emotional involvement in the referents or the topic of his/her utterance. Like the spatio-temporal *this*, emotional *this* indicates the speaker's "closeness" to something that he/she mentions, and emotional deictic *that* establishes emotional "distance" between the speaker and the addressee.

In this section, I briefly discussed two traditional studies of English demonstratives. Although these previous studies suggest basic functions and uses of demonstratives, they are not enough to explain how native English speakers choose referential forms in dynamic and natural discourse contexts. For more detailed explanations of the use of demonstratives, I will in the following sections introduce the Givenness Hierarchy and Strauss's alternative model as the main theoretical frameworks of this study. The former presents an implicational scale of "six cognitive statuses relevant to the form of referring expressions in natural language discourse" (Gundel et al. 1993:275), and the latter introduces gradient FOCUS, depending on the extent of sharedness and importance of information.

2.2 THE GIVENNESS HIERARCHY. Gundel, Hedberg, and Zacharski (1993) proposed a model that explains the relation between referential forms and six different cognitive statuses assumed by a speaker in natural discourse situations. Through an empirical study, Gundel et al. supported the universality of this model, suggesting correlations between cognitive statuses and different forms of reference in five languages: English, Japanese, Mandarin Chinese, Russian, and Spanish. The six cognitive statuses of the Givenness Hierarchy are shown below, along with the relevant English forms of the referring expression.

(3) The Givenness Hierarchy (Gundel et al. 1993:275).

In Focus	Activated	>	Familiar	>	Uniquely Identifiable	>	Referential	>	Type Identifiable
it	that this this N		that N		the N		indefinite this N		a N

Each status is not mutually exclusive but it is related to the others by entailing all lower statuses (statuses to the right). For example, if a speaker says *the book*, the speaker signals to a listener that he/she can identify which book is being discussed. If a speaker says *that book*, the speaker signals that a listener

knows which book is being discussed and is already familiar with the book. Therefore, he/she can identify it.

The notion that a higher status entails all lower statuses can also be understood as follows: IN FOCUS implies that the referent is also ACTIVATED, FAMILIAR, UNIQUELY IDENTIFIABLE, REFERENTIAL and TYPE IDENTIFIABLE. ACTIVATED implies FAMILIAR, UNIQUELY IDENTIFIABLE, REFERENTIAL, and TYPE IDENTIFIABLE. In contrast, lower statuses cannot imply upper statuses. The following sentences present each cognitive status with relevant referring forms.

(4) The six cognitive statuses with relevant referent forms (Gundel et al. 1993:276–80)

(a) TYPE IDENTIFIABLE
I couldn't sleep last night. *A* dog (next door) kept me awake.

(b) REFERENTIAL
I couldn't sleep last night. *This* dog (next door) kept me awake.

(c) UNIQUELY IDENTIFIABLE
I couldn't sleep last night. *The* dog (next door) kept me awake.

(d) FAMILIAR
I couldn't sleep last night. *That* dog (next door) kept me awake.

(e) ACTIVATED
I couldn't sleep last night. *That* kept me awake.

(f) IN FOCUS
My neighbor's bull mastiff bit a girl on a bike. *It*'s the same dog that bit Mary Ben last summer.

In the lowest status, TYPE IDENTIFIABLE, the speaker thinks that the addressee can "access a representation of the type of object described by the expression" (276). That is, the speaker believes that the addressee knows the meaning of the word and can understand the thing mentioned by the speaker. This status is "necessary for appropriate use of any nominal expression, and it is sufficient for the use of the indefinite article *a* in English" (276).

In the REFERENTIAL status, "the speaker intends to refer to a particular object or objects (276)." The addressee must "either retrieve an existing representation of the speaker's intended referent or construct a new representation by the time the sentence has been processed" (276) in order to understand some features or properties of the particular object(s) to which the speaker refers. The authors state that the indefinite *this* is the relevant form in English for the REFERENTIAL status.

In the UNIQUELY IDENTIFIABLE status, "the addressee can identify the speaker's intended referent on the basis of the nominal alone" (277). That is, it is not necessary that the addressee have previous knowledge of the referent that the speaker refers to. Instead, the addressee is expected "to construct or retrieve a representation on the basis of the referring expression alone" (277–78). In the case of the example sentence above, the hearer does not have to know of the existence of the neighbor's dog before hearing this utterance, but he/she can construct a representation of it based on the speaker's description. In this status, the definite article *the* is sufficient to signal the UNIQUELY IDENTIFIABLE status.

In these three statuses—TYPE IDENTIFIABLE, REFERENTIAL, and UNIQUELY IDENTIFIABLE—the addressee does not need to have a prior knowledge or representation of the referent. On the other hand, the three higher statuses require the addressee to have a prior representation of the referent that the speaker intends to refer to.

In the FAMILIAR status, the addressee already has a representation of the referent that the speaker refers to, so he/she can identify the intended referent representation based on his/her long-term or short-term memory. In this status, all personal pronouns and definite demonstratives are appropriate, and the demonstrative determiner *that* is sufficient. With respect to the example sentence, the addressee has to know that the speaker's neighbor has a dog, either from conversation or perhaps because the hearer has seen or heard the dog before.

The referent in the ACTIVATED status is "represented in current short-term memory" or "may have been retrieved from long-term memory" or "from the immediate linguistic or extralinguistic context" (278). In the above sentence, *that* could "refer to barking of a dog only if a dog has actually been barking during the speech event or if barking had been introduced in the immediate linguistic context" (278). The demonstrative pronoun *that* and stressed personal pronouns are appropriate for this status. The demonstrative pronoun *this* is used to refer to an entity that is speaker-activated whereas *that* is used by either the speaker or the listener to refer to the currently activated entity.

The highest status, IN FOCUS, is required for the appropriate use of zero pronouns and unstressed personal pronouns, when "the referent is not only in short-term memory, but is also at the current center of attention" (279). That is, the entity IN FOCUS indicates "the topic of the preceding utterance, as well as any still-relevant higher-order topics" (279). In example (5) below, the speaker introduces 'bull mastiff' in the preceding utterance (5a), and then the same referent, 'bull mastiff', is the topic of the following utterance in (5b). Therefore, the definite demonstrative *that* and unstressed personal pronoun *it* can be appropriate for this status. However, 'bull mastiff' in the prepositional phrase in (6a) cannot be the topic of the discourse, so the personal pronoun *it* in (6b) cannot be used to refer to the 'bull mastiff' (280):

(5) (a) My neighbor's bull mastiff bit a girl on a bike.
(b) It's / That's the same dog that bit Mary Ben last summer.

(6) (a) Sears delivered new siding to my neighbors with the bull mastiff.
(b) * It's / That's the same dog that bit Mary Ben last summer.
(c) Anyway, this siding is real hideous and …

2.3 THE GIVENNESS HIERARCHY AND GRICE'S MAXIMS OF QUANTITY. Gundel et al. (1993) emphasized that "each of the cognitive statuses in the Givenness Hierarchy entails all lower statues" (294), but not vice versa. According to this model, a form that is appropriate for a higher status can be replaced by the other forms that require a lower status. For example, a referent IN FOCUS can be coded by the pronoun *it*, the demonstrative pronoun *that*, or a noun with a definite article (i.e., *the* N). However, a referent in the FAMILIAR status can be coded by *that* N, but not by *that* or *it*. Here arises a question: if it is possible to express higher cognitive statuses with forms that are relevant for lower statuses, how can we choose an appropriate form for each status? Regarding this problem, the authors claimed that "the distribution of forms across statuses which meet necessary conditions for their appropriate use is not random" (294). Rather, they suggested that the Givenness Hierarchy interacts with Grice's Maxims of Quantity for the appropriate use of referential forms in each cognitive status.

(7) Grice's Maxims of Quantity
Q1 Make your contribution as informative as is required.
Q2 Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Based on Q1, a noun phrase with an indefinite article requires that its referent be TYPE IDENTIFIABLE or REFERENTIAL but not UNIQUELY IDENTIFIABLE, FAMILIAR, ACTIVATED, or IN FOCUS, because using an indefinite article allows an addressee to access just the representation of an object or objects, and not the uniquely identifiable referent. For example, when a speaker says "I bought a book yesterday," a listener cannot identify uniquely the referent of a book; he/she can only access the representation of *a book*.

Based on Q2, a form relevant for lower statuses is sometimes allowed for the higher statuses. For example, the status UNIQUELY IDENTIFIABLE is coded by noun phrases with the definite article *the*. However, *the N* is often used for the FAMILIAR status instead of using *that N*. In this case, both *the N* and *that N* enable an addressee to identify uniquely the referent that a speaker refers to, if it does not need to signal explicitly the higher cognitive status of the referent.

2.4 THE LIMITATIONS OF THE GIVENNESS HIERARCHY. Concerning English demonstratives, Gundel et al. (1993) distinguished *this* and *that* in the respect to ACTIVATED status in terms of activation: *this* is used when the speaker refers to the entity that was activated by the same speaker, whereas *that* is used when the speaker or the listener refers to the speaker-activated entity. Consider the following examples (Gundel et al. 1993:279):

(8) A: Have you seen the neighbor's dog?
B: Yes, and { ?? this dog / that dog } kept me awake last night.

(9) A: My neighbor has a dog. { This dog / That dog } kept me awake last night.

In example (8), when speaker B refers to the entity which was activated by speaker A, '*that* dog' is more natural than '*this* dog.' In example (9), either '*that* dog' or '*this* dog' is acceptable within one speaker's speech without differences in meaning and function.

In addition, as shown in table 1, it does not seem to be difficult to understand the use of the demonstrative determiners *this* and *that*, since they are used differently to identify referents in ACTIVATED and FAMILIAR statuses, respectively. Beyond activation, however, the Givenness Hierarchy does not provide enough explanation to make a clear distinction between the pronominal *this* and *that*.

Within the Givenness Hierarchy framework, the pronominal *this* and *that* belong to the ACTIVATED status, but it is still unclear how this can account for the situations shown in figure 1, which are used in Niimura and Hayashi's study (1996). Following Gundel et al.'s (1993) explanation, we expect that either *this* or *that* can be possible answers in figure 1, since both demonstrative pronouns can be activated by a speaker in an immediate linguistic context. Against this expectation, however, there seems to be a preference among native English speakers when choosing demonstrative pronoun forms for figure 1. From the results of Niimura and Hayashi's study, we have already drawn the conclusion that neither physical distance nor speaker's activation is sufficient to explain how native English speakers choose *this* and *that* in discourse contexts. That is, the different usages of *this* and *that* cannot be fully accounted for on the basis of the concept of activation in the Givenness Hierarchy model. Strauss's alternative model, introduced in the next section, will suggest another analysis for differentiating the functions of demonstrative *this* and *that* when they represent ACTIVATED status.

2.5 STRAUSS'S FOCUS MODEL. With a different perspective from the previous models, Strauss (1993, 2002) proposed an alternative model, which is based on the analysis of spontaneous, dynamic discourse among various participants. Concerning the previous studies on the demonstratives *this* and *that*, Strauss (2002) pointed out that they have been explained "on the basis of a static model, where "proximity" or "distality" governs the choice of one form over the other" (132). Unlike the traditional proximity/distance models, she included *this*, *that*, and *it* as natural members of demonstrative reference and introduces the concept of FOCUS. She used a concept of FOCUS based on Garcia's definition of "deixis," which is "the force with which the hearer is instructed to seek the referent" (Garcia 1975:65). Table 2 shows the proposed alternative model.

In this model, *this* indicates the HIGH FOCUS member, *that* the MEDIUM FOCUS member, and *it* the LOW FOCUS member. The degree of FOCUS is on a continuum. Strauss explained that FOCUS means simply "the degree of attention the hearer should pay to the referent" (135). As shown in table 2, the degree of sharedness of information and relative importance of referent are crucial factors when the speaker chooses demonstrative forms. That is, speakers' choices of demonstrative forms depend on how much they ask the interlocutor to pay attention to the referent. The more important the referent is and the newer the information is, the more attention is asked of the interlocutor

TABLE 2. Strauss's model of demonstrative reference (2002:135)

	Form	MEANING SIGNAL	Hearer	Referent
Degree of attention hearer is asked to pay to the referent	This	HIGH FOCUS	new information (not shared) ↓	important ↓
	That	MEDIUM FOCUS		
	It	LOW FOCUS	shared information	unimportant

Strauss used data from a 45,000–word spoken corpus to analyze *this* and *that* on the basis of Halliday and Hasan's (1976) referential classification: anaphoric (indicating an antecedent that is mentioned previously in the text), cataphoric (referring forward to another expression), exophoric (extralinguistic referents that are not expressed within the text) and non-phoric (referents that are neither in the text nor in situations, but in the speaker's mind); and gradient FOCUS: HIGH, MEDIUM, and LOW. The results of this study confirm that the demonstrative *this*, signaling cataphoric, exophoric, and non-phoric reference, tends to represent new information that has not been shared between the speaker and the interlocutor. Thus, the referent represented by the demonstrative *this* requires more attention from the hearer, which is associated with HIGH FOCUS. On the other hand, the demonstratives *that* and *it*, signaling anaphoric reference, tend to represent shared information between the speaker and the interlocutor. Since the referent is already present in speech, the hearer can grasp the speaker's intended referent, even if paying less attention. Therefore, *that* and *it* are related to MEDIUM FOCUS and LOW FOCUS, respectively.

In terms of the distributional functions, *this* is more frequently used as a modifier than as a head, whereas *that* is predominantly used as a head, as shown in table 3 below. According to Strauss's account, a noun phrase modified by *this* expresses new information more explicitly than a pronominal *this* because of the information in the noun phrase itself, which signals HIGH FOCUS. Since *that* as a head, on the other hand, indicates a known referent, the speaker and the interlocutor do not need to pay much attention to the referent in discourse, and it is not necessary to express it with a full noun phrase. Therefore, *that* as a head signals MEDIUM FOCUS.

TABLE 3. The distributional frequency of *this* and *that* (Strauss 2002)

	Head	Modifier	Total
This	146 (44%)	187 (56%)	333 (34.4%)
That	458 (72%)	177 (28%)	635 (65.6%)
Total	604 (62.4%)	364 (37.6%)	968 (100%)

Returning to Niimura and Hayashi's study (1996), how can Strauss's gradient FOCUS model explain the cases shown in figure 1? In figure 1A, the character seems to know that there is a bad stain on the floor and he wants to check it, bending his knees. Although he brings the referent into discourse for the first time, the speaker has already realized what it is in his mind. In this situation, the speaker does not need to pay much attention to the referent, which signals MEDIUM FOCUS. Compared to the situation in figure 1A, the character in figure 1B does not have any idea about the thing on the floor, and he looks curious about it. Concerning this situation, Niimura and Hayashi claim that the fact that many native English speakers chose *this*, a HIGH FOCUS marker, reflects the character's strong degree of curiosity toward the paper on the floor.

The studies reviewed above have presented different approaches to the English demonstratives. Despite the simple explanations given in many ESL/EFL classrooms, the functions and uses of English demonstratives turn out to be complex and diverse. Not only physical proximity but also psychological and

emotional proximity and discourse contexts are involved in choosing appropriate referent forms. On the basis of the theoretical perspectives reviewed above, the discussion in the following section will present the results of an analysis of *this* and *that* in spoken data, paying particular attention to the problems brought up by English demonstratives in the fields of second language teaching and learning.

3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY. For this study, the data were retrieved from two different sources, the Michigan Corpus of Academic Spoken English (MICASE: http://micase.umdl.umich.edu/m/micase) and from semi-spoken data,[1] specifically sitcom scripts (http://www.livesinabox.com/friends/scripts. html). The MICASE consists of approximately 1.8 million words and over 190 hours of recordings of academic speech from across various contexts at the University of Michigan. Since the topics of the MICASE corpus are limited to academic and professional issues, I also analyzed scripts from the sitcom, *Friends*,[2] using a corpus concordance program, MonoConc Pro, in order to examine how demonstratives are used in various daily discourse contexts.

For the data analysis, the total number of tokens of demonstratives *this* and *that* was counted, and the tokens were then categorized according to the cognitive statuses of referents, using Strauss's model. As all tokens were analyzed individually and the analysis process required a large amount of time, only part of the corpus data was examined in this study. The present study examined the transcripts of interviews, meetings, advising sessions, and office hours from the MICASE (26,354 words) and five episodes of *Friends* scripts (16,956 words), approximately 43,300 words in total.

3.1 CODING THE DATA. Following the model of Gundel et al. 1993, every instance of *this* and *that* is categorized. Although all forms of referring expressions such as indefinite noun phrase, definite noun phrase, bare noun, pronoun, and zero anaphora, are dealt with in the Givenness Hierarchy, the present study considers only the functions of the English demonstratives *this* and *that*. In particular, the examples of *this* and *that* used as heads in ACTIVATED status are reanalyzed, following Strauss's gradient FOCUS model, in order to distinguish cases not distinguished by Gundel et al. In this section, I will discuss how the cognitive status of each token was determined, with example sentences.

3.1.1 IN FOCUS. According to Gundel et al. 1993, the referent IN FOCUS is "the topic of the preceding utterance" and "any still-relevant higher-order topics" (279). In (10), for instance, the demonstrative *that* in the second sentence refers to the same referent, *her green dress*, mentioned in the preceding utterance. In addition, the same referent is placed in the subject position which is brought into focus. Thus, the demonstrative *that* is coded as IN FOCUS.

(10) (From the *Friends* script)
A: Phoebe, you go with Monica and try on her green dress. If *that* doesn't work, you can wear my gray silk one …

3.1.2 ACTIVATED. The representation of the referent that is ACTIVATED can be retrieved from the addressee's short-term memory or the long-term memory. The ACTIVATED referent can also arise from the extralinguistic context. In this study, some referents with situational factors are analyzed as ACTIVATED, although they were not mentioned in previous discourse. When a speaker introduces someone to another person, for instance, the speaker will say "*this* is Rachel." Another example is that a speaker says

[1] In this study, I analyzed sitcom transcripts, which are written conversations. These transcripts are orally presented through actors' and actresses' interactions, although their conversations are ready-made for the purpose of acting. Considering the spoken and written properties of sitcom transcripts, I categorized them as semi-spoken data.

[2] In this study, I analyzed five episodes of the sitcom, *Friends*, which was produced by Bright/Kauffman/Crane Productions and was broadcast from 1994 to 2004, on NBC in the U.S. The five episodes are as follows: "Ross's new girlfriend" (Series Two, Episode #1), "The one where no-one's ready" (Series Three, Episode #2), "The one with the jam" (Series Three, Episode #3), "The one with all the resolutions" (Series Five, Episode #11), and "The one with Ross's library book" (Series Seven, Episode #7).

to addressee "*this* is for you," indicating blackberry currant. In these cases, the addressee can identify the referent on the basis of the discourse situation as well as the referring expression. Although the referent is not mentioned in preceding discourse, the referent becomes activated in the immediate discourse context. Therefore, the demonstrative pronoun *this* is characterized as ACTIVATED.

In (11) a speaker is asking a question, picking up a notebook. The speaker uses the pronominal *this*, which is ACTIVATED, due to situational factors. In addition, the pronominal *this* is used because the object is close to the speaker in terms of distal proximity, and she refers to a newly introduced referent in this discourse context.

(11) (From the *Friends* script)
A: What's *this*?
B: Oh, *this* is a log I kept, recording her every movement.

Example (11), however, presents a problem in the speaker B's utterance. In (11), it seems possible that the second demonstrative pronoun *this* can be replaced with *that*, since both referring expressions refer to an entity in ACTIVATED. Although Gundel et al. (1993) suggest speaker activation to distinguish *this* and *that*, both demonstratives sound natural and appropriate in this context. As in this example, the distinction between *this* and *that* in the ACTIVATED status often does not look clear. Thus, Strauss's alternative model is employed in order to specify in what situations each of these two demonstratives is used. According to Strauss's model, in example (11), the pronoun *this* is required rather than *that* because the referent is newly introduced in this context, and is not shared information with the addressee. Therefore, it is necessary to draw more of the hearer's attention to the referent, which causes the speaker to use the HIGH FOCUS marker, *this*.

3.1.3 FAMILIAR. In this status, the speaker assumes that the addressee knows the intended referent, which can be retrieved from the addressee's long-term or short-term memory. Although the referent has not been mentioned during the discourse, the addressee can identify what the speaker refers to, because a representation of the referent is already in his/her memory. In (12), for instance, the speaker refers to *that sweater* under the assumption that the addressee also knows which sweater he is talking about, on the basis of the addressee's long-term memory. If the addressee does not know about that sweater at all, the speaker's expression is totally infelicitous. Thus, the demonstrative in example (12) is considered a FAMILIAR entity.

(12) (From the *Friends* script)
A: Hey, remember *that sweater* I gave you for your birthday?

Another example of a FAMILIAR entity, which is represented in the speaker's and addressee's short-term memory, is given in (13). When the addressee can retrieve a referent that has been recently mentioned in the current discourse situation, the referent is also categorized as FAMILIAR. In (13), for example, students in a physics research group meeting were talking about items that they needed to purchase. At the beginning they started to talk about an old internal mirror. Then, they changed the topic into the focal length and three people kept talking about the focal length for about twenty turns. After that, one of them referred to the old mirror again to explain why they did not use the old mirror. Although the referent was not continuously invoked in the discourse, it was still in the speaker's and addressee's short-term memory and they could identify which mirror was talked about. Therefore, the referent, *that mirror*, can be categorized as FAMILIAR too.

(13) (from a physics research group meeting transcript in the MICASE)
A: yeah, I I've ordered two channel plates and, or two pairs of channel plates and, a, mirror.
B: a mirror?
A: the new focusing mirror for
B: oh, internal mirror, okay
A: inside my chamber cuz the old one's crap. um, it's a dielectric.
C: wha- and what what's the focal length?

A: in terms of (xx) uh, ten centimeters. same as before and i i could change the focal length actually since um.
(talking about the focal length of the mirror continuously)
after 18 turn-takings

B: so, the big problem there was we could, somehow never get the intensity low enough to get into the right regime, it was always too high. and that's why we couldn't use *that mirror*. ultimately we never did use it. we used the external focusing.

3.1.4 UNIQUELY IDENTIFIABLE. The referent that can be identified by the addressee "on the basis of nominal alone" (277) is classified as UNIQUELY IDENTIFIABLE. The addressee already has a representation of the referent in his/her memory, but it is not necessary that the addressee have previous familiarity as long as he/she can identify the referent based on "the referring expression alone" (278). No example, however, is categorized as UNIQUELY IDENTIFIABLE in this study. Although noun phrases with demonstratives are definite and uniquely identified, they refer to entities in upper statuses such as FAMILIAR, ACTIVATED, or IN FOCUS.

3.1.5 REFERENTIAL. In the REFERENTIAL status, the addressee needs to access either a particular object or a proper type-representation to understand something about the referent that a speaker mentions. In (14), a speaker talks about a certain time period and a counselor. In this case, the referents, *this period* and *this guidance counselor*, are not in the hearer's long-term memory, but they are particular to the speaker. The speaker intended to express something about a specific time period and a counselor by using indefinite *this*, which is categorized as REFERENTIAL.

(14) (From the *Friends* script)
A: Wait, you know what, I got a little story. When I was in Junior High School I went through *this period* where I thought I was a witch. And there was *this guidance counselor* who said something to me, that I think will help you a lot …

3.1.6 TYPE IDENTIFIABLE. The referent in the TYPE IDENTIFIABLE status does not refer to a specific thing. Rather, the referent indicates "a non-specific member of the class invoked by the noun in an irrealis modality" (Kim 2000:114). The addressee is expected to be able to access a representation of a type of the object that the speaker mentions.

In oral discourse, for example, speakers often use phrases like "*this* stuff," "*that* kind of," and so on. Since *this* and *that* as used in "*this* kind of …," "*this* stuff," and "*that* kind of …" function as indefinite determiners like the indefinite determiner *a*, they are categorized as TYPE IDENTIFIABLE: the referent indicates just a type of thing, not a particular thing.

4. RESULTS.

4.1 FREQUENCY OF DEMONSTRATIVES. The frequency of demonstratives *this* and *that* out of approximately 43,300 words is presented in table 4 below. The total number of target tokens is 454, and each token is analyzed on the basis of its grammatical function—head or modifier.

TABLE 4. The distributional frequency of *this* and *that*

	Head (*this, that*)	Modifier (*this N, that N*)	Total
This	134 (29.6%)	110 (24.2%)	244 (53.8%)
That	152 (33.5 %)	58 (12.8%)	210 (46.2 %)
Total	286 (63.1%)	168 (37.0%)	454 (100%)

As shown in table 4, the total numbers of tokens of *this* and *that* are 244 (53.8%) and 210 (46.2%) out of 454 instances, respectively. Overall, the demonstrative *this* is used a little more frequently than *that*. *This* as a head appears 134 (29.6%) times and as a modifier 110 (24.2%) times, and *that* as a head appears 152 (33.5%) times and as a modifier 58 (12.8%) times. Among the four forms, *that* as a head (33.5%) occurs the most frequently, whereas *that* as a modifier (12.8%) occurs the least.

4.2 DISTRIBUTION OF THE ENGLISH DEMONSTRATIVES. Table 5 presents the distribution of the demonstratives *this* and *that* in the present study and table 6 demonstrates the results of Gundel et al.'s study (1993) according to the highest cognitive status. As shown below, there are some distributional differences in the results of the two studies. Some instances of this study appear to go against the constraints explained by Gundel et al. (1993) in that some demonstratives are coded as TYPE IDENTIFIABLE in this study. Appendix A presents each instance of this study that shows distributional differences from that of the Gundel et al.'s study (1993).

TABLE 5. Distribution of English demonstratives of the present study according to highest status.

	IN FOCUS	ACTIVATED	FAMILIAR	UNIQUELY	REFERENTIAL	TYPE	TOTALS
This	10	124					134
That	25	127					152
This N	1	88					89
that N		33	17			8	58
Indefinite *This N*					15	6	21
TOTALS	36	372	17	0	15	14	454

TABLE 6. Distribution of English demonstratives according to highest status (Gundel et al. 1993:291).

	IN FOCUS	ACTIVATED	FAMILIAR	UNIQUELY	REFERENTIAL	TYPE	TOTALS
This		15					15
That	1	17					18
This N	1	11					12
That N		10	7				17
Indefinite *This N*					1		1
TOTALS	2	53	7	0	1	0	63

If we look at some examples of the current study that go against the constraints of the Givenness Hierarchy, we find that eight instances of *that N* and six of *this N* are coded as TYPE IDENTIFIABLE, which is sufficient for use of the indefinite article *a/an*. Here are some examples coded as TYPE IDENTIFIABLE. In (15), the referents in expressions such as *this* meter, *this* stuff, *that* meter, and *that* stuff, are TYPE IDENTIFIABLE, because they do not refer to a particular, specific type of things. S1 in (15) wants the addressee to construct a representation of the type of things. Therefore, they are nonreferential.

(15) (From the transcript of linguistics independent study advising in MICASE)
S1: Oh have you read the Poetics?
S2: I've read some.
S1: That's about all that's necessary. A lot of it's about *this* meter for *that* stuff and *that* meter for *this* stuff and who gives a shit if you don't speak Greek you know but uh what he says about metaphor is right, I think and and he- he hit on it. He says it's uh, in fact that's what the superscript on my paper is. Um, by far the greatest thing is metaphor.

5. DISCUSSION. Gundel et al. 1993 proposed the Givenness Hierarchy to demonstrate how the speaker chooses appropriate referring expressions to refer to an object or objects and how the addressee can identify the speaker's intended referent. They examined various types of referring expressions to explore their functions and use. This study, however, focused on the demonstratives *this* and *that* only to account for different uses whose distinction is sometimes considered unclear. Since the notions of proximity and distance cannot fully explain the differences between the demonstratives *this* and *that*, the Givenness Hierarchy and Strauss's FOCUS approach are employed in this study, and the results are similar to those of Gundel et al.'s study, as shown in table 4 and table 5.

As in Gundel et al.'s study (1993), this study shows that the pronominal and determiner *this* are mostly ACTIVATED and the indefinite determiner *this* is REFERENTIAL. The distributional patterns of the pronominal and determiner *that* are also similar to those of Gundel et al.'s study. The only different pattern in these two studies appears in TYPE IDENTIFIABLE, because eight tokens of determiner *that* and six of indefinite *this* are categorized in this status, although, according to Gundel et al.'s study (1993), all noun phrases with a demonstrative are definite and at least familiar.

With respect to the ACTIVATED status, Gundel et al. (1993) distinguished the pronominal *this* and *that* in terms of activation. This criterion, however, is not sufficient to explain the differences between these two demonstratives, so Strauss's FOCUS model was introduced in this study. Following the FOCUS model, (16) and (17) are analyzed as below:

(16) (From the *Friends* script)
Malcolm: … *This* is the book I pretend to read when I'm watching her in the park….
Phoebe: Oh, yeah. What's *this*?
Malcolm: Oh, *this* is a log I kept, recording her every movement.

In (16), the pronominal *this* is mentioned three times during the conversation. First, Malcolm says *this* to refer to a book that is not previously mentioned in the current discourse, which indicates new information or a new entity and signals HIGH FOCUS. Second, Phoebe asks a question of Malcolm, saying "What's *this*?" In this situation, it seems that both *this* and *that* are possible. However, she uses the HIGH FOCUS marker *this* and this is appropriate to represent the speaker's strong curiosity about a referent that is unshared information between the speaker and the hearer. Finally, Malcolm uses *this* to talk about the thing that Phoebe asked about. In this situation, the pronoun *that* or *it* can be used when Malcolm answers Phoebe's question, according to many ESL/EFL textbooks. But Malcolm uses the HIGH FOCUS marker *this* to emphasize the importance of the referent instead of using the MEDIUM FOCUS marker *that* or LOW FOCUS marker *it*.

Here are some more examples with MEDIUM FOCUS marker *that*. In (17), two students are talking about a paper that S3 wrote for his assignment. The writing tutor, S1, advises S3 to reorganize some parts of sentences. Here, S1 uses the MEDIUM FOCUS marker *that* to talk about the element that S1 is saying to change, since it is a relatively important referent for the interlocutor to pay attention to. Although the part that needs to be changed has already been mentioned before, S3 uses the MEDIUM FOCUS marker *that* instead of using the LOW FOCUS *it*, because it is more or less shared information between the speaker and the hearer.

(17) (From the transcript of an English composition tutorial in MICASE)
S1: … these are the conclusions you draw because of….
S3: or, right my stereotypes of them right.
S1: you need to get *that* up front.
S3: okay. I'll put *that* in the first sentence then when I fix it.

Besides the uses of the demonstratives examined above, there are a number of other functions of *this* and *that* that are not dealt with in this study. First, *this* and *that* in real discourse situations can refer not only to concrete objects but also to discourse situations, interlocutor's previous utterances, or interlocutor's actions, such as "*That*'s a good idea," "*That* sounds interesting," "(pointing in the air to distract the addressee's attention) Look at *that*," "*That*'s right," "In *this* case ...," and so forth. Concerning these discourse functions of *this* and *that*, Petch-Tyson (2000) uses the term "situation reference," meaning reference to "higher-order entities such as event, propositions, facts etc., which are often non-nominal antecedents" (45). That is, the demonstratives *this* and *that* used as situation reference refer to previous sentences, clauses, and discourse situations, not to noun phrases.

Second, another use of demonstratives is frequently found in temporal expressions; for example, *this* morning, *this* year, at *that* time and so on. As Lakoff (1974) explained, *this* and *that* in temporal expressions are generally related to proximity and distance. This usage, however, needs to be explored more because the choice of a proper demonstrative in these expressions is, to an extent, subjective depending on the speaker's intentions and discourse context (Petch-Tyson 2000).

Finally, a demonstrative can be used as a cataphora. For example, the demonstrative *this* in expressions such as "How about *this*" and "Hey, look at *this*" does not refer to anything that is mentioned in the previous discourse. Rather, the demonstratives are used when the speaker suggests his/her idea or asks for the addressee's attention to refer to something that is going to be mentioned in the following discourse.

6. CONCLUSION. The findings of this study suggest that the functions and uses of English demonstratives *this* and *that* are different in terms of physical proximity, psychological and emotional proximity, and discourse contexts. This study deals with the singular forms of English demonstratives *this* and *that* only. It did not go so far as to examine the functions and usage of the plural forms, *these* and *those*. For further research, it would be interesting to compare the differences between *these* and *those*, as well as between the singular and the plural forms. Also, a pedagogical implementation of the results of this study needs to be investigated for future studies in order to demonstrate the advantages of using corpora in real L2 classrooms.

APPENDIX

Here are all instances of the demonstratives *this* and *that* that show distributional differences from the results of Gundel et al.'s study (1993).

A. *that* N: TYPE IDENTIFIABLE (eight instances)

1-2. From the transcript of linguistics independent study advising in MICASE

S1: Oh have you read the Poetics?

S2: I've read some.

S1: That's about all that's necessary. A lot of it's about this meter for *that* stuff and *that* meter for this stuff and who gives a shit if you don't speak Greek you know but uh what he says about metaphor is right, I think and and he- he hit on it. He says it's uh, in fact that's what the superscript on my paper is. Um, by far the greatest thing is metaphor.

3-4. From the transcript of linguistics independent study advising in MICASE

S1: Oh I see. Okay. Um, well there's this, kind of programming, called object-oriented programming and it's uh ordinarily … programming started off with, you know everything was do this do this do this do this do this do this. It's all orders. And, then it turned out that, the smart way to do it, was to define large complicated structures, very much in the way S-G-M-L does. And once you once you define *that* stuff then, you can write a program for that particular thing like suppose you want to, you want to add complex numbers. Well you can't just use a regular plus. So you have to have a special meaning of plus for complex numbers. So, but you don't wanna have to try and worry about, is this a complex number do I use this plus or that plus or something else. So what you do is you say, uh w-i won't worry about is this a number, I'll just send it a plus and let it decide which plus to use, cuz it knows. That's called operator overloading. Plus is a, is an operator and it's overloaded because it has one meaning in this context one meaning in *that* context one meaning in some other context and so on. And that's this kind of thing.

5. From the transcript of linguistics independent study advising in MICASE

S1: … uh, so I … there's a sense in which communication and the self sort of mutually create each other so that would make them a good, a good, candidate for this sort of things. Uh, did they go through, I've forgotten what- there's a special name for a special a one one of their best example, um, Turner and Fauconnier is, uh, like, lemme see X is the Y of Z. Did they they run through those things? Like um, uh like uh… Grgich Hills is the, Chateau Mouton Rothschild of California wines. So you've got three things, and you can set it up to, uh to show how how they work, and what is what it means to say *that* sort of thing. And you can even, they can even get reflexive like, one I actually heard. Uh Cadillac is the Rolls Royce of American automobiles, or of automobiles in general …

6. From the transcript of a freshmen orientation tour in MICASE

S1: … so anyway we're about to go into the Reading Room, there might be some people in there, it is a Monday, it is seven o'clock so there might be like one or two in there. Summer classes happening *that* kind of thing so please keep that in mind. If there's not, I'll just talk normally, do our thing.

7. From the transcript of linguistics independent study advising in MICASE

S1: uh, like the root metaphors of fascism, *that* sort of thing.

8. From the script of "The jam" in *Friends*

Monica: I don't need an actual man, just a couple of his best swimmers. And there, there are places you can go to get *that* stuff.

B. *this* N: TYPE IDENTIFIABLE (six instances)

1-2. From the transcript of linguistics independent study advising in MICASE

S1: Oh have you read the Poetics?

S2: I've read some.

S1: That's about all that's necessary. A lot of it's about *this* meter for that stuff and that meter for *this* stuff and who gives a shit if you don't speak Greek you know but uh what he says about metaphor is right, I think and and he- he hit on it. He says it's uh, in fact that's what the superscript on my paper is. Um, by far the greatest thing is metaphor.

3-4. From the transcript of linguistics independent study advising in MICASE

S1: Oh I see. Okay. Um, well there's *this* kind of programming, called object-oriented programming and it's uh ordinarily… programming started off with, you know everything was do this do this do this do this do this. It's all orders. And, then it turned out that, the smart way to do it, was to define large complicated structures, very much in the way S-G-M-L does. And once you once you define that stuff then, you can write a program for that particular thing like suppose you want to, you want to add complex numbers. Well you can't just use a regular plus. So you have to have a special meaning of plus for complex numbers. So, but you don't wanna have to try and worry about, is this a complex number do I use this plus or that plus or something else. So what you do is you say, uh w-i won't worry about is this a number, I'll just send it a plus and let it decide which plus to use, cuz it knows. That's called operator overloading. Plus is a, is an operator and it's overloaded because it has one meaning in this context one meaning in that context one meaning in some other context and so on. And that's *this* kind of thing.

5. From the transcript of linguistics independent study advising in MICASE

S1: … uh, so I … there's a sense in which communication and the self sort of mutually create each other so that would make them a good, a good, candidate for *this* sort of things. Uh, did they go through, I've forgotten what- there's a special name for a special a one one of their best example, um, Turner and Fauconnier is, uh, like, lemme see X is the Y of Z. Did they they run through those things? Like um, uh like uh… Grgich Hills is the, Chateau Mouton Rothschild of California wines. So you've got three things, and you can set it up to, uh to show how how they work, and what is what it means to say that sort of thing. And you can even, they can even get reflexive like, one I actually heard. Uh Cadillac is the Rolls Royce of American automobiles, or of automobiles in general …

6. From the script of "No one's ready" in *Friends*

Joey: Okay, buddy-boy. Here it is. You hid my clothes, I'm wearing everything you own.

Chandler: Oh my God! That is so not the opposite of taking somebody's underwear!!

Joey: Look at me! I'm Chandler! Could I be wearing any more clothes? Maybe if I wasn't going commando …

Chandler: Oooo-ooh!

Joey: Yeah. Whew, it's hot with all of *this* stuff on. I ah, I better not do any, I don't know, lunges.

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